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Abstract. Herbrand and Skolemization theorems are obtained for a
broad family of first-order substructural logics. These logics typically
lack equivalent prenex forms, a deduction theorem, and reductions of
semantic consequence to satisfiability. The Herbrand and Skolemization
theorems therefore take various forms, applying either to the left or right
of the consequence relation, and to restricted classes of formulas.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide Herbrand and Skolemization theorems for
a broad family of first-order substructural logics that encompasses first-order
fuzzy logics, intermediate logics, exponential-free linear logic, relevance logics,
and logics without contraction (see, e.g., [11, 15, 8, 19, 9]). Such logics are of-
ten undecidable, but their (decidable) fragments provide the foundations for
knowledge representation and reasoning methods such as non-classical logic pro-
gramming and description logics (see, e.g., [21, 14, 12, 10]). One motivation for
the work reported here is to avoid a duplication of research effort by provid-
ing a general approach to the development of automated reasoning techniques
for first-order substructural logics. Herbrand and Skolemization theorems play a
pivotal role in this development, reducing first-order problems to propositional
problems. These theorems are also helpful for addressing theoretical problems
in particular cases such as first-order  Lukasiewicz logic.
In classical first-order logic, questions of validity and semantic consequence
reduce to the satisfiability of a set of sentences; Skolemization and Herbrand
theorems then reduce these questions further to the satisfiability of a set of
propositional formulas (see, e.g., [5]). In first-order substructural logics, seman-
tic consequence does not (typically) reduce to satisfiability and in the absence of
quantifier shifts and a deduction theorem, non-prenex formulas should be con-
sidered on both sides of the consequence relation. The general Skolemization and
Herbrand theorems obtained here therefore take various forms, applying either
to the left or right of the consequence relation, and to restricted sets of formulas.
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The theorems cover first-order intuitionistic logic and t-norm based fuzzy logics,
studied already in [16, 2, 1, 3], and other logics not previously considered.3 We
also obtain a new (topology-free) proof of the approximate Herbrand theorem
for first-order  Lukasiewicz logic (see [4]) via a Herbrand theorem for satisfiability
that may hold when the Herbrand theorems for consequence fail.
The logics investigated in this paper are defined based on arbitrary classes
of complete FLe-algebras and include logics defined as extensions of (multiple-
conclusion and hypersequent variants of) the full Lambek calculus with exchange
augmented with quantifier rules (see [9, 18, 17]). Herbrand and Skolemization
theorems may often be established for such logics proof-theoretically (see [15]) via
mid(hyper)sequent theorems proved using permutations of rules tailored to the
case at hand. By contrast, the uniform approach described in this paper is purely
algebraic and applies also to many cases where no calculus has yet been defined.
2 Preliminaries
In first-order classical logic, predicates are interpreted as relations on a universe
S, or, equivalently, as functions from S to the two element Boolean algebra 2.
In the logics defined below, other algebras may take the place of 2. That is,
a predicate may take one of many values, which might represent, for example,
degrees of truth, belief, or confidence. For convenience, we restrict our atten-
tion here to FLe-algebras (algebras for the full Lambek calculus with exchange
and multiplicative additive intuitionistic linear logic without additive constants).
Broadening the scope to non-commutative (or even non-associative) algebras or
algebras with different operation symbols would lead to similar results, but com-
plicate the presentation without adding greatly to our stock of useful examples.
Definition 1. An FLe-algebra is an algebra A = 〈A,&,→,∧,∨, 0, 1〉 such that:
(a) 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a lattice with an order defined by x ≤ y iff x ∧ y = x.
(b) 〈A,&, 1〉 is a commutative monoid.
(c) → is the residuum of &; i.e., for all x, y, z ∈ A: x& y ≤ z iff x ≤ y → z.
The algebra A is complete if for all X ⊆ A, both ∨X and ∧X exists in A, and
A is an FLe-chain if for all x, y ∈ A, either x ≤ y or y ≤ x.
Example 1. Significant FLe-chains include the real unit interval [0, 1] with the
usual order, 0 = 0 and 1 = 1, and the monoidal operation & interpreted as the
 Lukasiewicz t-norm max(x+y−1, 0), the Go¨del t-norm min(x, y), or the product
t-norm x ·y. More generally, let ∗ be any residuated uninorm: an associative and
commutative binary function ∗ on [0, 1] that is increasing in both arguments and
3 After submitting this paper, we discovered that Terui has independently obtained
related results for Herbrand theorems in substructural logics [20]. However, his ap-
proach is narrower and more algebraic in scope (e.g., Skolemization is not really
considered); his main result shows rather that algebras for a broad class of logics
admit suitable completions and that therefore these logics have a Herbrand theorem.
has a unit e∗ and residuum →∗. Then 〈[0, 1], ∗,→∗,min,max, d, e∗〉 is an FLe-
chain for any d ∈ [0, 1]. Other examples of FLe-chains include the lattice-ordered
groups formed by the integers, rationals, or reals with the usual order, addition
as the monoidal operation (with subtraction as its residuum), and 0 = 1 = 0.
Example 2. The class FLe of FLe-algebras forms a variety and its subvarieties
provide algebraic semantics for a broad spectrum of substructural logics: in par-
ticular, extensions of the sequent calculus FLe. For example, FLew-algebras for
FLe with weakening are FLe-algebras satisfying 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, while FLewc-algebras
for intuitionistic logic (term-equivalent to Heyting algebras) are FLew-algebras
satisfying x&x = x. Other varieties consist of “involutive” FLe-algebras satis-
fying (x → 0) → 0 = x (corresponding to multiple-conclusion sequent calculi)
and “semilinear” FLe-algebras satisfying ((x → y) ∧ 1) ∨ ((y → x) ∧ 1) = 1
(corresponding to hypersequent calculi). In particular, semilinear FLe-algebras,
FLew-algebras, and FLewc-algebras provide algebraic semantics for, respectively,
uninorm logic, monoidal t-norm logic, and Go¨del logic (see [7, 9, 15, 6]).
Varieties of FLe-algebras may enjoy a useful property that allows us to restrict
attention to their complete members. Let A,B be FLe-algebras. An embedding
f : A → B is regular if f(∨C) = ∨ f [C] (whenever ∨C exists) and f(∧D) =∧
f [D] (whenever
∧
D exists) for all C,D ⊆ A. A class K of FLe-algebras admits
regular completions if each A ∈ K regularly embeds into some complete B ∈ K.
Example 3. A family of varieties of FLe-algebras (including, e.g., the varieties of
FLe-algebras, FLew-algebras, and FLewc-algebras) is described in [6] that admit
regular completions if a corresponding sequent calculus admits a strong form
of cut elimination. It is not known, however, whether a proof system (of some
specified form) must always exist for classes of FLe-algebras admitting regular
completions. Varieties of FLe-algebras satisfying the prelinearity law do not in
general admit regular completions, but this may still be true for the class of
chains of such varieties. In particular, if a variety of FLe-algebras admits regular
completions, then the class of chains of this variety (which generates the variety
of semilinear members of the variety) also admits regular completions.
A (countable) predicate language P is a triple 〈P,F,ar〉 where P and F are
non-empty countable sets of predicate and function symbols, respectively, and
ar is a function assigning to each predicate and function symbol ? an arity
ar(?) = n ∈ N (? is called n-ary). The function symbols f for which ar(f) = 0
are called object constants and we will assume without loss of generality in
this paper that every predicate language has at least one object constant. For
convenience, we also call predicate symbols P for which ar(P ) = 0, propositional
atoms, and a language P containing only propositional atoms, propositional.
Given a fixed countably infinite set OV of object variables x, y, . . . , P-terms
s, t, . . . , and (atomic) P-formulas ϕ,ψ, χ, . . . are defined as in classical logic using
quantifiers ∀ and ∃, but with binary connectives &,→,∧,∨, logical constants 0, 1,
and derived connectives ¬ϕ defined as ϕ→ 0 and ϕ↔ ψ as (ϕ→ ψ)∧ (ψ → ϕ).
The notions of bound and free variables, closed terms, sentences, and sub-
stitutability are also defined in the standard way. Instead of ξ1, . . . , ξn (where
ξi’s are terms or formulas and n is arbitrary or fixed by the context) we will
sometimes write just ξ. Unless stated otherwise, by the notation ϕ(z) we signify
that all free variables of ϕ are among those in the list of pairwise different object
variables z. If ϕ(x1, . . . , xn, z) is a formula and we replace all free occurrences
of xi’s in ϕ by terms ti, we denote the resulting formula in the context simply by
ϕ(t1, . . . , tn, z). We write χ[ϕ] for a formula χ with a distinguished subformula
ϕ and understand χ[ψ] as the result of replacing ϕ in χ with the formula ψ. A
P-theory T is just a set of P-formulas.
The usual classical notions of structure, evaluation, and truth definition may
be generalized relative to a complete FLe-algebra A as follows, assuming from
now on that K is an arbitrary class of complete FLe-algebras.4 As usual for
substructural logics, a formula ϕ will be “true” in a structure based on an FLe-
algebra A if it always takes value greater than or equal to 1
A
.
Definition 2. A P-structure S = 〈A,S〉 consists of a complete FLe-algebra A





f∈F〉 where S is a non-empty set, PS is a
function Sn → A for each n-ary predicate symbol P ∈ P, and fS : Sn → S is a
function for each n-ary function symbol f ∈ F. An S-evaluation is a mapping
v : OV → S. By v[x→a] we denote the S-evaluation where v[x→a](x) = a and
v[x→a](y) = v(y) for each object variable y 6= x.
We interpret terms and evaluate formulas in S as follows:
‖x‖Sv = v(x)
‖f(t1, . . . , tn)‖Sv = fS(‖t1‖Sv , . . . , ‖tn‖Sv ) for f ∈ F
‖P (t1, . . . , tn)‖Sv = PS(‖t1‖Sv , . . . , ‖tn‖Sv ) for P ∈ P
‖ϕ ◦ ψ‖Sv = ‖ϕ‖Sv ◦A ‖ψ‖Sv for ◦ ∈ {&,→,∧,∨}
‖c‖Sv = cA for c ∈ {0, 1}
‖(∀x)ϕ‖Sv = inf≤A{‖ϕ‖Sv[x→a] | a ∈ S}
‖(∃x)ϕ‖Sv = sup≤A{‖ϕ‖Sv[x→a] | a ∈ S}.
A P-structure M = 〈A,M〉 is a P-K-model of a P-theory T , written M |= T ,
if A ∈ K and for each ϕ ∈ T and M-evaluation v, ‖ϕ‖Mv ≥ 1
A
.
4 First-order logics can be defined based on arbitrary classes of FLe-algebras by requir-
ing only that necessary suprema and infima exist for a particular structure. Indeed,
this more general semantics is needed for certain axiomatization results: e.g., for
first-order logics based on the classes of all MV-chains or BL-chains [11, 8] (inter-
estingly, axiomatizability is lost if we restrict to complete MV-chains or complete
BL-chains). On the other hand, for classes of algebras admitting regular completions
(see Example 3), the general definition gives exactly the consequence relation for the
complete members of the class, and we can use the mentioned axiomatization re-
sults. Moreover, since our Skolemization and Herbrand theorems apply only to these
classes, we may simplify our presentation here without limiting its scope.
To simplify notation, for a formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and an S-evaluation v with
v(xi) = ai, we write ‖ϕ(a1, . . . , an)‖S instead of ‖ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)‖Sv . Note that, as
in classical logic, the truth value of a sentence does not depend on an evaluation.
Also, M |= ϕ→ ψ iff for each evaluation v, ‖ϕ‖Mv ≤ ‖ψ‖Mv , and M |= ϕ↔ ψ iff
for each evaluation v, ‖ϕ‖Mv = ‖ψ‖Mv .
Definition 3. A P-formula ϕ is a semantic consequence of a P-theory T in K,
written T |=PK ϕ, if for each P-K-model M of T , also M |= ϕ.
Both in the definition of model and semantic consequence, the language plays
a minor role. Indeed, for any P-theory T ∪ {ϕ}, T |=PK ϕ iff T |=P
′
K ϕ for any
P ′ ⊇ P. We omit the prefixes for the class K or language P when known from
the context.
The next lemma collects together some useful facts for FLe-algebras.
Lemma 1 ([8, 15, 18]). Given formulas ϕ,ψ, χ, a variable x not free in χ, and
a term t substitutable for x in ϕ:
1. |=K (∀x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t) 8. |=K (∃x)(ϕ→ χ)→ ((∀x)ϕ→ χ)
2. |=K ϕ(t)→ (∃x)ϕ(x) 9. |=K (χ& (∃x)ϕ)↔ (∃x)(χ& ϕ)
3. |=K (∀x)(χ→ ϕ)↔ (χ→ (∀x)ϕ) 10. |=K (χ& (∀x)ϕ)→ (∀x)(χ& ϕ)
4. |=K (∀x)(ϕ→ χ)↔ ((∃x)ϕ→ χ) 11. |=K (∃x)(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ ((∃x)ϕ ∨ (∃x)ψ)
5. {ϕ,ϕ→ ψ} |=K ψ 12. |=K (χ ∨ (∀x)ϕ)→ (∀x)(χ ∨ ϕ)
6. {ϕ} |=K (∀x)ϕ 13. |=K ((∀x)ϕ ∧ (∀x)ψ)↔ (∀x)(ϕ ∧ ψ)
7. |=K (∃x)(χ→ ϕ)→ (χ→ (∃x)ϕ) 14. |=K (∃x)(χ ∧ ϕ)→ (χ ∧ (∃x)ϕ).
Moreover, if K is a class of complete FLe-chains:
15. |=K (∀x)(χ ∨ ϕ)↔ χ ∨ (∀x)ϕ 16. |=K (∃x)(χ ∧ ϕ)↔ χ ∧ (∃x)ϕ.
Notice that certain quantifier shifts (7–14) are available for every choice of K,
and two more (15–16) if K consists of FLe-chains, but that, in general, the
formulas (χ → (∃x)ϕ) → (∃x)(χ → ϕ), ((∀x)ϕ → χ) → (∃x)(ϕ → χ), and
(∀x)(χ&ϕ)→ (χ& (∀x)ϕ) (where x is not free in χ) are not valid (see e.g. [8]).
A description of propositional substructural logics is implicit in our defini-
tions. Let P0 be a propositional language (in the sense described above) con-
sisting of countably infinitely many propositional atoms. Then clearly any P0-
formula ψ is equivalent to a quantifier-free formula ψ′; i.e., |=K ψ ↔ ψ′. Hence
we can identify |=P0K with the propositional logic of K. In particular, the propo-
sitional logic of all complete FLe-algebras is the finitely axiomatizable logic
FLe and other well-known propositional substructural logics are axiomatized
by adding finitely many additional (propositional) axioms.
Consider a variety V of FLe-algebras and suppose that either V or the class of
chains in V admits regular completions. Let K be the class of complete members
of V or the class of complete chains of V, respectively. Then the first-order logic
|=PK is axiomatized by extending an axiomatization of |=P0K (where all proposi-
tional atoms are replaced by arbitrary P-formulas) with the deduction rules 5
and 6 of modus ponens and generalization and axioms 1–4 plus axiom 15 if K
consists only of FLe-chains (see [8]).
3 Skolemization
In this section, we provide two quite general Skolemization theorems for first-
order substructural logics. Unlike first-order classical logic, we cannot assume the
existence of equivalent prenex formulas or reductions of semantic consequence to
satisfiability. We therefore obtain separate Skolemization theorems for formulas
of a restricted form on the right and left of the consequence relation, where the
latter is established only for certain cases.
Recall that K is an arbitrary class of complete FLe-algebras.
Theorem 1 (Skolemization Right). For each P-theory T ∪{ϕ(x,y), ψ} and
function symbols fϕ 6∈ P of the same arity as y:
T |=K ψ → (∃y)(∀x)ϕ(x,y) iff T |=K ψ → (∃y)ϕ(fϕ(y),y)
T |=K (∀y)(∃x)ϕ(x,y)→ ψ iff T |=K (∀y)ϕ(fϕ(y),y)→ ψ.
Proof. The left-to-right directions of both claims are straightforward; just note
that |=K (∀x)ϕ(x,y)→ ϕ(fϕ(y),y) and |=K ϕ(fϕ(y),y)→ (∃x)ϕ(x,y).
We prove the right-to-left directions contrapositively, assuming without loss
of generality (see Lemma 1) that T ∪{ψ} consists of P-sentences. Let us consider
just the first equivalence, the proof of the second being very similar. Suppose
that T 6|=K ψ → (∃y)(∀x)ϕ(x,y). So there is a modelM = 〈A,M〉 of T such that
V = ‖(∃y)(∀x)ϕ(x,y)‖M 6≥ ‖ψ‖M. I.e., V < V ∨‖ψ‖M. Clearly, for eachm ∈M ,
‖(∀x)ϕ(x,m)‖ ≤ V . We show that there exists r ∈ A satisfying V ≤ r < V ∨
‖ψ‖M such that for each m ∈ M , there is a d ∈ M satisfying ‖ϕ(d,m)‖M ≤ r.
This is obviously the case if there exists r ∈ A such that V < r < V ∨ ‖ψ‖M.
Otherwise, we can take r = V : in this case, ‖(∀x)ϕ(x,m)‖ ≤ V implies that
there exists d ∈M such that ‖ϕ(d,m)‖M ≤ V . Finally, define (using the axiom
of choice) fϕ(m) = d with ‖ϕ(d,m)‖M ≤ r and note that ‖(∃y)ϕ(fϕ(y),y)‖M ≤
r < V ∨ ‖ψ‖M. Thus ‖(∃y)ϕ(fϕ(y),y)‖M 6≥ ‖ψ‖M. uunionsq
Theorem 2 (Skolemization Left). Suppose that one of the following holds:
(a) K is the class of complete members of a variety of FLewc-algebras (Heyting
algebras) admitting regular completions.
(b) K is the class of complete chains of a variety of FLe-algebras whose class
of chains admits regular completions.
(c) max{V ∈ A | V < 1A} exists for all A ∈ K (e.g., if each A ∈ K is finite).
(d) K consists of the standard  Lukasiewicz algebra [0, 1]Ł (see Example 1).
Then for each P-theory T ∪ {ϕ(x,y), ψ} and any function symbol fϕ 6∈ P of the
same arity as y:
T ∪ {(∀y)(∃x)ϕ(x,y)} |=K ψ iff T ∪ {(∀y)ϕ(fϕ(y),y)} |=K ψ.
Proof. We consider just the right-to-left direction of the above equivalence. The
other direction always holds, using |=K ϕ(fϕ(y),y)→ (∃x)ϕ(x,y).
For (a), note first that |=K can be axiomatized as an axiomatic extension of
first-order intuitionistic logic and therefore admits the deduction theorem. Hence
T ∪ {(∀y)(∃x)ϕ(x,y)} |=K ψ implies T |=K (∀y)(∃x)ϕ(x,y) → ψ and then, by
Theorem 1, T |=K (∀y)ϕ(fϕ(y),y) → ψ. So by the deduction theorem again,
T ∪ {(∀y)ϕ(fϕ(y),y)} |=K ψ.
For (b), we apply [8, Theorem 4.5.7] which establishes that the above equiv-
alence holds if it holds in the special case where y is empty. Suppose then that
T ∪ {(∃x)ϕ(x)} |=K ψ. By the local deduction theorem for first-order substruc-
tural logics (see [15, Theorem 8.9]), T |=K (((∃x)ϕ(x))∧1)n → ψ for some n ∈ N
(where χ0 = 1 and χn+1 = χn & χ for n ∈ N). Because K consists of chains,
also T |=K (∃x)(ϕ(x)∧ 1)n → ψ for some n ∈ N (see [8, Proposition 4.3.2]). But
then, by Theorem 1, T |=K (ϕ(cϕ) ∧ 1)n → ψ for some n ∈ N and new constant
cϕ. So finally, by the local deduction theorem again, T ∪ {ϕ(cϕ)} |=K ψ.
For (c) and (d), we prove that the Skolemization property is implied by the
following condition: whenever T 6|=K ϕ, there is aK-modelM = 〈A,M〉 of T such
thatM 6|= ϕ and for each formula (∃x)χ(x,y) and a ∈M , ‖(∃x)χ(x,a)‖M ≥ 1A
implies ‖χ(w,a)‖M ≥ 1A for some w ∈M .
Suppose that T ∪ {(∀y)(∃x)ϕ(x,y)} 6|=K ψ. By assumption, there is a model
M of T ∪ {(∀y)(∃x)ϕ(x,y)} such that M 6|= ψ and for each a ∈ M , since
‖(∃x)ϕ(x,a)‖M ≥ 1, there is w ∈ M such that ‖ϕ(w,a)‖M ≥ 1. But then (by
the axiom of choice), we can define a function fϕ and expand the model M into
a model M ′ such that ‖ϕ(fϕ(a),a)‖M′ ≥ 1 and ‖χ(b)‖M = ‖χ(b)‖M′ for each
P-formula χ and b ∈M . SoM′ is a model of T ∪{(∀y)ϕ(fϕ(y),y)} andM′ 6|= ψ.
(c) follows almost immediately. For (d), assume that T 6|=[0,1]Ł ϕ and let M
be a [0, 1]Ł-model of T such that T 6|= ϕ. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that T ∪ {ϕ} consists of sentences. Then using [12, Lemma 3] we obtain
a [0, 1]Ł-model M
′ satisfying: (1) there is an embedding f : [0, 1]Ł → [0, 1]Ł such
that for each sentence χ: f(‖χ‖M) = ‖χ‖M′ ; (2) for each formula χ(x,y) and
a ∈M ′, there is w ∈M ′ such that ‖(∃x)χ(x,a)‖M′ = ‖χ(w,a)‖M′. Clearly this
is the desired model. uunionsq
The Skolemization left property described in Theorem 2 fails for many other
choices of K, even when y is empty. For example, let K be the class of complete
FLe-algebras and consider a language P with a single unary relation symbol P ,
extended with a new constant symbol c. Clearly {P (c)} |=K P (c) & P (c), so
{P (c)} |=K (∃x)(P (x) & P (x)).
Consider, however, an FLe-algebra A with A = {0, a1, a2, 1}, 0 < a1, a2 < 1, a1
and a2 incomparable, 1 & x = x& 1 = x, and x& y = 0 for x, y ∈ {0, a, b}, and
let M = 〈A,M〉 be a model with M = {d1, d2} and ‖P (di)‖M = ai for i = 1, 2.
Then M is a model of (∃x)P (x), but not of (∃x)(P (x) & P (x)), so
{(∃x)P (x)} 6|=K (∃x)(P (x) & P (x)).
4 An Expansion Lemma
A standard semantic proof of the Herbrand theorem for first-order classical logic
consists of two steps. First it is shown that a universal formula is satisfiable iff
the (typically infinite) set of its ground instances is satisfiable. Then by com-
pactness, this set of ground instances is satisfiable iff each of its finite subsets is
satisfiable. In this section, we establish an analogue of the first step for all first-
order substructural logics considered in this paper: an “expansion lemma” that
replaces universally quantified formulas on the left of the consequence relation
with their instances. We then extend applications of this lemma to a wider class
of semantic consequences.
In first-order classical logic, it can be assumed (using Skolemization and
quantifier shifts) that only universal formulas appear on the left and existential
formulas on the right of the consequence relation. Indeed we may even consider,
using the deduction theorem, only existential formulas on the right, or, using
also the double negation law, only universal formulas on the left. In general, for
first-order substructural logics, formulas are not equivalent to prenex formulas
and the deduction theorem and double negation law fail. Nevertheless, we can
establish Herbrand theorems of the same scope using formulas that are classically
equivalent to universal and existential formulas. Such formulas are defined using
BNF as follows, denoting quantifier-free formulas (for a given language) by ∆0:
g-universal formulas P ::= ∆0 | P ∧ P | P ∨ P | P & P | (∀x)P | N → P
g-existential formulas N ::= ∆0 | N ∧N | N ∨N | N &N | (∃x)N | P → N.
We refer to theories containing only (g-)universal and (g-)existential formulas as
(g-)-universal and (g-)existential theories, respectively.
The key ingredient for the expansion lemma is the behaviour of g-universal
and g-existential sentences under taking substructures.
Definition 4. A P-structure M1 = 〈A,M1〉 is a substructure of a P-structure
M2 = 〈A,M2〉 if M1 ⊆ M2 and ∗M1(a) = ∗M2(a) for each predicate and
function symbol ∗ of P and each a ∈M1.
Proposition 1. For any substructure M′ of a P-structure M:
1. M |= ϕ iff M′ |= ϕ whenever ϕ is a quantifier-free P-sentence.
2. M |= ϕ implies M′ |= ϕ whenever ϕ is a g-universal P-formula.
3. M′ |= ϕ implies M |= ϕ whenever ϕ is g-existential P-formula.
Proof. The proposition is an easy corollary of the following two claims, proved
jointly for any M′-evaluation e by induction on the definition of χ:
(i) ‖χ‖M′e ≥ ‖χ‖Me for any g-universal P-formula χ
(ii) ‖χ‖M′e ≤ ‖χ‖Me for any g-existential P-formula χ.
If χ is quantifier-free, then clearly ‖χ‖M′e = ‖χ‖Me . For the induction step we
prove two cases, other cases being very similar. If χ = (∀x)ϕ for some g-universal
formula ϕ, then for each a ∈M :




e[x→a] | a ∈M ′} = ‖(∀x)ϕ‖M
′
e .
If χ = ϕ → ψ for some g-existential formula ϕ and g-universal formula ψ, then
by the induction hypothesis:
‖ϕ‖M′e ≤ ‖ϕ‖Me and ‖ψ‖M
′
e ≥ ‖ψ‖Me .
So by the monotonicity of the operations and the definition of truth:
‖ϕ→ ψ‖Me = ‖ϕ‖Me → ‖ψ‖Me ≤ ‖ϕ‖M
′
e → ‖ψ‖Me
≤ ‖ϕ‖M′e → ‖ψ‖M
′
e
= ‖ϕ→ ψ‖M′e . uunionsq
For any predicate language P, the Herbrand universe U(P) is the set of
closed P-terms, recalling that, by assumption, every predicate language contains
at least one object constant and hence U(P) 6= ∅.
Lemma 2 (Expansion Lemma). For each g-existential P-formula ψ and each
g-universal P-theory T ∪R:
T ∪{(∀x)ϕ(x) | ϕ(x) ∈ R} |=K ψ iff T ∪{ϕ(t) | ϕ(x) ∈ R, t ∈ U(P)} |=K ψ.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is straightforward since |=K (∀x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t).
We prove the converse direction contrapositively. Let S = T ∪ {ϕ(t) | ϕ(x) ∈ R,
t ∈ U(P)} and suppose that there is a modelM = 〈A,M〉 of S such thatM 6|= ψ.
Consider the substructure M′ = 〈A,M′〉 with domain M ′ = {‖t‖M | t ∈ U(P)}.
Then by Proposition 1,M′ is a model of S such thatM′ 6|= ψ. Consider ϕ(x) ∈ R.
For each b ∈ M ′ there is t ∈ U(P) such that b = tM and we have M′ |= ϕ(t).
So M′ |= (∀x)ϕi. Hence T ∪ {(∀x)ϕ(x) | ϕ(x) ∈ R} 6|=K ψ. uunionsq
In the remainder of this section, we show that the expansion lemma applies
to a wider class of consequences. We show (in Corollary 1 and Lemma 5) that
although g-universal and g-existential formulas are not equivalent to univer-
sal and existential formulas, checking semantic consequence between g-universal
formulas on the left and g-existential formulas on the right may be reduced to
checking semantic consequence between universal formulas on the left and exis-
tential formulas on the right. To prove this we first state two technical lemmata:
one concerning montonicity properties for g-universal and g-existential formulas
and the other concerning predicate substitutions.
Lemma 3.
1. {ϕ→ ψ} |=K χ[ϕ]→ χ[ψ] for any g-universal formula χ[(∀x)α].
2. {ϕ→ ψ} |=K χ[ψ]→ χ[ϕ] for any g-existential formula χ[(∀x)α].
3. {ϕ→ ψ} |=K χ[ψ]→ χ[ϕ] for any g-universal formula χ[(∃x)α].
4. {ϕ→ ψ} |=K χ[ϕ]→ χ[ψ] for any g-existential formula χ[(∃x)α].
Proof. We prove 1 and 2 together by induction on the definition of the g-universal
or g-existential formula χ[(∀x)α]; the proofs of 3 and 4 are analogous. The base
case where χ = (∀x)α or (∀x)α does not occur in χ is immediate (note that the
first option could not happen in case 2). For the induction step, we have one of
the following cases:
– χ = χ1[(∀x)α] ◦ χ2 or χ = χ1 ◦ χ2[(∀x)α] for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,&}.
– χ = χ1[(∀x)α]→ χ2 or χ = χ1 → χ2[(∀x)α].
– χ = (∀y)χ1[(∀x)α] or χ = (∃y)χ1[(∀x)α].
In the first two cases we use the induction hypothesis and derivability of useful
consequences. For example, suppose that χ = χ1[(∀x)α] → χ2. If χ is a g-
universal formula, then χ1[(∀x)α] is a g-existential formula and by the induction
hypothesis {ϕ→ ψ} |=K χ1[ψ]→ χ1[ϕ] and so
{ϕ→ ψ} |=K (χ1[ϕ]→ χ2)→ (χ1[ψ]→ χ2).
If χ is a g-existential formula, then χ1[(∀x)α] is a g-universal formula and by
the induction hypothesis: {ϕ→ ψ} |=K χ1[ϕ]→ χ1[ψ] and so
{ϕ→ ψ} |=K (χ1[ψ]→ χ2)→ (χ1[ϕ]→ χ2).
For the last case, suppose that χ = (∀y)χ1[(∀x)α]. By the induction hypothesis
{ϕ→ ψ} |=K χ1[ϕ]→ χ1[ψ]
and the result follows using properties of |=K given in Lemma 1. uunionsq
Lemma 4. A predicate substitution σ is any mapping assigning to each n-ary
predicate symbol P ∈ P a P-formula σ(P ) of n free variables. The substitution
is extended to arbitrary P-formulas by substituting each atomic predicate P (t)
with a P-formula σ(P )(t). Then for any P-theory T ∪ {ϕ}:
T |=K ϕ implies σ[T ] |=K σ(ϕ).
Moreover, the converse direction holds when the only predicates in T ∪ {ϕ} are
propositional atoms and σ restricted to the set of propositional atoms is a one-
one mapping into the set of closed atomic formulas.
Proof. We proceed by contraposition. If σ[T ] 6|=K σ(ϕ), then there is a model
M′ with of σ[T ] such that M′ 6|= σ(ϕ). We construct a model M with the same
domain as M′ where fM = fM
′
and PM(a) = ‖σ(P )(a)‖M′. Thus for every
formula ψ we can easily show by induction:
‖ψ(a)‖M = ‖σ(ψ)(a)‖M′ .
Then M is indeed a model of T such that M′ 6|= ϕ.
For the converse direction, we can assume without loss of generality that there
are no quantifiers in T ∪{ϕ}. Assume further that we have a modelM = 〈A,M〉
of T such that M 6|= ϕ. We define a model M′ = 〈A,M′〉 with the domain
consisting of closed terms, functional symbols interpreted in the obvious way,









Note that the definition is sound because σ is a one-one mapping. To complete
the proof we observe that for each χ ∈ T ∪ {ϕ}, we have ‖σχ‖M′ = ‖χ‖M. uunionsq
Corollary 1. Let T be a P-theory, ϕ a P-sentence, and P /∈ P. Then
T |=K ϕ iff T ∪ {ϕ→ P} |=K P.
Proof. Immediate, using the previous lemma for the right-to-left direction and
the soundness of modus ponens for the left-to-right direction. uunionsq
Lemma 5. For any g-universal formula ϕ, there is a finite set F (ϕ) of universal
sentences such that for each theory T ∪ {χ}:
T ∪ {ϕ} |=K χ iff T ∪ F (ϕ) |=K χ.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the number of quantifiers in ϕ. The
base case, where ϕ is already a universal formula, is immediate; we just let F (ϕ)
consist of the universal closure of ϕ. Suppose that ϕ has a proper universal
subformula; i.e., ϕ = ϕ[(∀x)ψ(x,y)] for some quantifier-free formula ψ(x,y).
Given a new predicate symbol Pψ of an appropriate arity (the length of y), it
suffice to show that
T ∪ {ϕ} |=K χ iff T ∪ {(∀x)(∀y)(Pψ(y)→ ψ(x,y)), ϕ[Pψ(y)]} |=K χ,
since then we can apply the induction hypothesis. The left-to-right direction
follows using Lemma 3 to obtain {Pψ(y)→ (∀x)ψ(x,y)} |=K ϕ[Pψ(y)]→ ϕ and
then Lemma 1. The converse direction follows from Lemma 4 using a substitution
σ that is the identity except for σ(Pψ) = (∀x)ψ(x,y). The case where ϕ has an
existential subformula is very similar. uunionsq
5 Herbrand Theorems
The expansion lemma reduces semantic consequence involving certain first-order
formulas to propositional consequence. To obtain Herbrand theorems involving
finite sets of formulas, we require a further crucial ingredient. Let us say that K
is finitary if for each propositional language P and P-theory T ∪ {ϕ}:
T |=PK ϕ iff there is a finite T ′ ⊆ T such that T ′ |=PK ϕ.
In particular, any class K satisfying one of the following conditions is finitary
(this follows from the fact that in these cases there is a finitary axiomatization
of |=PK for every propositional language P; see the end of Section 2):
– The class of complete algebras of a variety admitting regular completions;
this is the case, e.g., if the variety is axiomatized relative to the class of FLe
by so-called N2 identities (see [6]).
– The class of complete chains of a variety whose class of chains admits regular
completions; this is the case, e.g., if the variety is axiomatized relative to the
class of FLew by so-called P3 identities.
– A finite class of finite algebras.
The next lemma shows that finitarity at the propositional level extends to a
more general first-order setting (even without axiomatization results).
Lemma 6. If K is finitary, then for each g-universal P-theory T and g-existential
P-formula χ:
T |=K χ iff there is a finite T ′ ⊆ T such that T ′ |=K χ.
Proof. Note that we may assume without loss of generality that T ∪{χ} consists
of sentences. We show first that it is sufficient to give the proof for the case where
χ is a propositional atom. If T |=K χ, then by Corollary 1, T ∪ {χ→ P} |=K P
for some new propositional atom P . But then if T ′ ∪ {χ → P} |=K P for some
finite T ′ ⊆ T , by Corollary 1 again, T ′ |=K χ.
Suppose now that T |=K P . Using Lemma 5, we obtain for each ϕ ∈ T , a
finite universal theory F (ϕ) such that⋃
ϕ∈T
F (ϕ) |=K P.
Using Lemma 2 we obtain⋃
ϕ∈T
{ψ(t) | (∀x)ψ(x) ∈ F (ϕ) and t ∈ U(P)} |=K P.
All the formulas in this semantic consequence are quantifier-free sentences. Hence
using Lemma 4 and the finitarity of K, for some finite T ′ ⊆ T⋃
ϕ∈T ′
{ψ(t) | (∀x)ψ(x) ∈ F (ϕ) and t ∈ U(P)} |=K P.
But then by Lemma 2,
⋃
ϕ∈T ′
F (ϕ) |=K P , and Lemma 5 completes the proof. uunionsq
Now putting together the expansion lemma and Lemma 6, we obtain:
Corollary 2. If K is finitary, then for each g-universal P-theory T∪{(∀x)ϕ(x)}
and g-existential P-formula ψ:
T ∪{(∀x)ϕ(x)} |=K ψ iff T ∪{ϕ(t) | t ∈ H} |=K ψ for some finite H ⊆ U(P).
We now extend Corollary 2 to obtain Herbrand theorems on both sides of
the consequence relation with g-universal formulas on the left and a g-existential
formula on the right. The P-Herbrand expansion E(ϕ) of a P-formula ϕ consists
of all formulas obtained by applying the following two steps repeatedly, starting
with ϕ, until no quantifiers remain:
I Replace ψ[(∀x)χ(x,y)] where χ is quantifier-free with ψ[∧t∈H χ(t,y)] for
some finite H ⊆ U(P).
II Replace ψ[(∃x)χ(x,y)] where χ is quantifier-free with ψ[∨t∈H χ(t,y)] for
some finite H ⊆ U(P).
Notice that if ϕ is a sentence, then so are all formulas in E(ϕ). Moreover,
a simple induction making use of Lemma 3 together with |=K (∀x)χ(x,y) →∧
t∈H χ(t,y) and |=K
∨
t∈H χ(t,y)→ (∃x)χ(x,y) establishes:
Lemma 7. Let ϕ be a P-formula and ϕ′ ∈ E(ϕ). Then |=K ϕ → ϕ′ if ϕ is
g-universal, and |=K ϕ′ → ϕ if ϕ is g-existential.
We are now able to establish Herbrand theorems for the left and right sides
of the consequence relation, obtaining an equivalence for the left side.
Theorem 3 (Herbrand Left). The following are equivalent:
(1) K is finitary.
(2) For every g-universal theory T ∪ {ϕ} and g-existential P-formula χ:
T ∪ {ϕ} |=K χ iff there exists ϕ′ ∈ E(ϕ) such that T ∪ {ϕ′} |=K χ.
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) The right-to-left direction follows directly using Lemma 7. For
the left-to-right direction, it is sufficient to use Lemma 5 to obtain a finite set
of universal formulas F (ϕ) and then apply Corollary 2. However, to see that we
obtain exactly the formulas we need, we consider again the induction step of the
proof of Lemma 5.
Recall that we proceed by induction on the number of quantifiers in ϕ. For the
induction step, we suppose that ϕ has a proper universal subformula (∀x)ψ(x,y)
i.e., ϕ = ϕ[(∀x)ψ(x,y)] (if it has no such subformula, then ϕ has an existential
subformula (∃x)ψ(x,y) and the proof is analogous). Recall that a new predicate
symbol Pψ of an appropriate arity (the length of y) is introduced such that
T ∪ {ϕ[Pψ(y)]} ∪ {(∀x)(∀y)(Pψ(y)→ ψ(x,y))} |=K χ.
Now we can use Corollary 2 for T ∪{ϕ[Pψ(y)]} and (∀x)(∀y)(Pψ(y)→ ψ(x,y))
to obtain a finite H ⊆ U(P) such that
T ∪ {ϕ[Pψ(y)]} ∪ {(∀y)(Pψ(y)→ ψ(t,y)) | t ∈ H} |=K χ.
So also using the properties of ∧:




By Lemma 4, using a substitution σ that satisfies σ(Pψ) =
∧
t∈H ψ(t,y) and is
the identity otherwise:
T ∪ {σ(ϕ[Pψ(y)])} |=K χ.
To complete the proof, note that the induction hypothesis can be applied to
σ(ϕ[Pψ(y)]) = ϕ[
∧
t∈H ψ(t,y)]. Crucially, by repeating this process until we
obtain a quantifier-free formula, we obtain the appropriate element of E(ϕ).
(2)⇒ (1) Let P0 be a propositional language and P a predicate language with
a unary predicate symbol P such that U(P) is countably infinite. We enumerate
the elements of U(P) as ti (n ∈ N), and the elements of P0 as Pi (without loss
of generality we can assume that P0 is also infinite). Let {ϕi | i ∈ N} ∪ {ψ} be
a set of propositional formulas such that
{ϕi | i ∈ N} |=P0K ψ.
Then because {(∀x)P (x), P (ti)→ ϕi} |=K ϕi, we obtain
{(∀x)P (x)} ∪ {P (ti)→ ϕi | i ∈ N} |=K ψ.




P (ti)} ∪ {P (ti)→ ϕi | i ∈ N} |=K ψ.
We define a P0 ∪P-substitution σ that satisfies σP2k = P (tk) and σP2k+1 = Pk




P2i} ∪ {P2i → ϕ¯i | i ≤ n} |=K ψ,
where ϕ¯i is the formula resulting from ϕi by replacing propositional atoms Pk by
P2k+1. Finally, we use the first part of Lemma 4 and the substitution σP2k = ϕk
and σP2k+1 = Pk to obtain {ϕi | i ≤ n} |=K ψ. Hence {ϕi | i ≤ n} |=P0K ψ. uunionsq
Theorem 4 (Herbrand Right). If K is finitary, then for every g-universal
P-theory T and g-existential P-formula ψ:
T |=K ψ iff there is ψ′ ∈ E(ψ) such that T |=K ψ′.
Proof. The left-to-right direction follows directly using Lemma 7. For the right-
to-left direction, we use Corollary 1 to obtain T ∪ {ψ → P} |=K P (for a new
propositional atom P ). Using Theorem 3, we obtain ψ′ ∈ E(ψ) such that T ∪
{ψ′ → P} |=K P , and we use Corollary 1 again to complete the proof. uunionsq
We show finally that finitarity and the Herbrand theorems fail for any logic
admitting quantifier shifts that is defined by a class of FLe-algebras with arbi-
trarily large chains (for example, logics based on classes of finite FLe-algebras
containing chains of increasing size).
Proposition 2. Suppose that:
(a) {(∀x)ϕ→ ψ} |=K (∃x)(ϕ→ ψ) where x is not free in ψ.
(b) For each n ∈ N, there is an FLe-chain A ∈ K such that |A| ≥ n.
Then K is not finitary and |=K does not admit the left or right Herbrand theorem.
Proof. Consider a language with a unary predicate symbol P and a constant
symbol c. Since |=K (∀x)P (x) → (∀y)P (y), by (a) and Lemma 1, also |=K
(∃x)(∀y)(P (x)→ P (y)). So by Theorem 2, |=K (∃x)(P (x)→ P (f(x))). Suppose
that the right Herband theorem holds, noting that this is implied by the left Her-
brand theorem or finitarity. Then we have |=K
∨
i≤n(P (f
i(c)) → P (f i+1(c)))
for some n ∈ N. Consider, however, a model M over the chain A with a de-
scending sequence of elements a1, . . . , an+1 whose domain is the Herbrand uni-
verse and predicate P defined such that PM(f i(c)) = ai for i ≤ n + 1 and
PM(t) = a1 otherwise. Then ‖P (f i(c))→ P (f i+1(c))‖M = ai → ai+1 < 1A and
so M 6|= ∨i≤n(P (f i(c))→ P (f i+1(c))), a contradiction. uunionsq
6 A Herbrand Theorem for Satisfiability
The Herbrand theorem for first-order classical logic may be stated in terms
of satisfiability rather than semantic consequence. As remarked already, this is
not generally the case for first-order substructural logics. Indeed there are cases
where K is not finitary and the left and right Herbrand theorems fail, but a
Herbrand theorem for satisfiability holds.
A P-theory T is K-satisfiable if it has a P-K-model. Let us say that K is
compact if for each propositional language P: a P-theory T is K-satisfiable iff
each finite T ′ ⊆ T is K-satisfiable. Then by adjusting the proof of Theorem 3
(and corresponding necessary lemmata) to deal with satisfiability rather than
consequence and using compactness rather than finitarity, we obtain:
Theorem 5. If K is compact, then for every g-universal theory T ∪ {ϕ}:
T ∪ {ϕ} is K-satisfiable iff T ∪ {ϕ′} is K-satisfiable for every ϕ′ ∈ E(ϕ).
For example, the classes consisting of just the standard algebra of  Lukasiewicz
logic or product logic (see Example 1) are compact but not finitary. For product
logic, satisfiability coincides with classical satisfiability. For  Lukasiewicz logic,
compactness is proved in [11, Theorem 5.4.24] and the failure of finitarity is
folklore, see e.g. [11, Remark 3.2.15]. Indeed, the failure of finitarity and the left
and right Herbrand theorems for this logic also follow from Proposition 2.
We show that the previous theorem can be used to obtain a new topology-
free proof of an “approximate” Herbrand theorem treated in a slightly weaker
form in [4]. First we introduce a useful notion of approximate validity for [0, 1]Ł,
defining for each r ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q:
T |=Ł r < ψ iff for every [0, 1]Ł-model M of T , r < ‖ψ‖M.
Lemma 8. For any r ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, there exists a quantifier-free formula χPr
containing just one propositional atom P such that for any theory T ∪ {ψ} in
which P does not occur:
T |=Ł r < ψ iff T ∪ {ψ → χPr } is [0, 1]Ł-unsatisfiable.
In particular, let r = nn+1 for n ∈ N. Then χPr = (P ∧ ¬Pn) has this property.
Proof. By McNaughton’s theorem [13], for each r ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q, there is a propo-
sitional formula χr of one variable p such that χr(
1
2 ) = r and χr(d) ≤ r for all
d ∈ [0, 1]. We define χPr to be the result of replacing p with a nullary predicate
symbol P in χr. To prove the above claim, we proceed contrapositively. Suppose
that T 6|=Ł r < ψ. Then there is a [0, 1]Ł-modelM of T such that ‖ψ‖M ≤ r. Ex-
pand this model by setting ‖P‖M = 12 and we obtain a [0, 1]Ł-model of ψ → χPr .
I.e., T ∪ {ψ → χPr } is [0, 1]Ł-satisfiable. Conversely, suppose that M is a [0, 1]Ł-
model of T ∪ {ψ → χPr }. Then ‖ψ‖M ≤ ‖χPr |M ≤ r as required. uunionsq
It follows that the approximate consequence relation for r ∈ [0, 1] ∩ N can be
defined in terms of the standard consequence relation |=[0,1]Ł .
The following proposition and approximate Herbrand theorem for  Lukasiewicz
logic are now immediate consequences of Lemma 8 and Theorem 5.
Proposition 3. For each g-universal theory T ∪ {ϕ}, g-existential formula ψ,
and r ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q:
T |=Ł r < ψ iff T |=Ł r < ψ′ for some ψ′ ∈ E(ψ)
T ∪ {ϕ} |=Ł r < ψ iff T ∪ {ϕ′} |=Ł r < ψ for some ϕ′ ∈ E(ϕ).
Theorem 6. For each g-universal theory T ∪ {ϕ} and g-existential formula ψ:
T |=[0,1]Ł ψ iff for all n ∈ N, T |=Ł nn+1 < ψ′ for some ψ′ ∈ E(ψ)
T ∪ {ϕ} |=[0,1]Ł ψ iff for all n ∈ N, T ∪ {ϕ′} |=Ł nn+1 < ψ for some ϕ′ ∈ E(ϕ).
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